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A PAYGO system may serve as insurance against not having children and as an enforcement
device for ungrateful children who are unwilling to pay their parents a pension. In fact, the latter was
Bismarck’s historic motive for introducing this system. It is true that the PAYGO system reduces the
investment in human capital, but if it is run on a sufficiently small scale, it may nevertheless bring
about a welfare improvement. If, on the other hand, the scale of the system is so large that parents
bequeath some of their pensions to their children, it is overdrawn and creates unnecessarily strong
disincentives for human capital investment.
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1. Introduction
Once Bismarck’s social reforms were seen as a major institutional achievement, many
countries endeavored to copy them. Now, a century later, the initial enthusiasm has waned,
and the pay-as-you-go pension system (PAYGO), in particular, has come under heavy
attack. Among others things, the PAYGO system is accused of being unable to provide
satisfactory pensions in a time of declining population growth, of reducing labor supply, of
offering an inefficiently low rate of return, and of distorting people’s fertility choices.
Although some of these accusations against the PAYGO system are justified, the fact
that this system may also bring about favorable allocation effects should not be over-0047-2727/$ - see front matter D 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00015-X
$ This is a revised version of a paper presented on the occasion of Agnar Sandmo’s sixtieth birthday.
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be likely to occur with private annuity markets (Townley and Boadway, 1988; Feldstein,
1990), the avoidance of free riding by parents who plan to exploit the altruism of their
children (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1988), or intergenerational risk sharing (Smith, 1982;
Enders and Lapan, 1982; Gordon and Varian, 1988; Hassler and Lindbeck, 1997). This
paper adds two further potentially favorable effects which do not seem to have received
any attention in the literature.
First, the PAYGO system may provide insurance against not having children. If every
household were able to have children, they could receive their pensions from their own
children. However, given the risk of being infertile or not finding an appropriate partner, a
pooling system, which makes it possible to receive the pension from other people’s
children, if necessary, could be welcomed as an insurance device. Clearly, this type of
insurance may be useful when there is no capital market and human capital is the only
form of intertemporal resource transfer. However, even with such a capital market, human
capital investment has the advantage of offering inframarginal returns above the market
rate of interest. If these inframarginal returns are available only with a certain probability,
risk averse households may gain from pooling and sharing the resource flows provided by
their children. A problem arises, however, insofar as pooling reduces the incentive to
invest in human capital in the sense of having children and educating them. This is a moral
hazard effect which is a typical drawback of any type of insurance. It remains to be seen
whether the PAYGO system retains a useful role despite an endogenous decline in human
capital investment.
Second, the PAYGO system may serve as an enforcement device for ungrateful
children, or ‘rotten kids’, to use Becker’s (1976) language. In fact, it is precisely this
enforcement function that induced Bismarck to introduce the old age pension system in
Germany. Bismarck wanted the pension system as a substitute for the transfer mechanisms
of the traditional family that had been destroyed by the industrial revolution, seeing it
mainly as a means to avoid the neglect and mistreatment of old people by their children1.
Within the traditional family, there may have been sufficiently strong enforcement
mechanisms to make sure that children would provide for their old parents. As shown in a
seminal paper by Cigno (1993), there is a chance for self-enforcing family constitutions
which ensure the necessary intergenerational transfers even in the absence of intergener-
ational altruism. However, the loosening of family ties that characterizes modern societies1 In the seminal speech which Chancellor Bismarck gave to the Reichstag in 1881 to initiate his reforms he
said that it was important to preserve a sense of human dignity and to prevent the deprivation involved in living
on charity by giving the impoverished old and disabled a pension (see Stein, no year, p. 174). Remarkably, he
used the word ‘peculium’ to characterize this pension. The peculium is the money that a Roman master left to the
control of his slaves and that he allowed his slaves to save for the purpose of buying their liberty towards the end
of their working life. Bismarck knew what he was saying when he compared the old and disabled with Roman
slaves and when he elaborated on the mistreatment of old people in their families extensively in his speech. His
goal was to enable the recipients of the peculium to open doors which otherwise would have remained closed and
to buy better treatment from their families. He believed that, without the peculium, the impoverished old and
disabled would have no weapon against being ‘pushed into a corner’ and suffering hunger. He mistrusted the
benevolence and generosity of the new type of family that had emerged from urbanization and industrialization
and saw the pension system as an enforcement device for ensuring a resource transfer to the older generation.
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corresponding duties. The consequence of this development was an unpleasant situation
for those old and disabled people who had to rely on voluntary transfers from their
children. All too often a high price in lost dignity and self-determination, or even intra-
family work and starvation, had to be paid by the old.
The neglect of old people is not only a problem in its own right, it may also induce
adults, who anticipate the future behavior of their children, to underinvest in human capital
in the sense of choosing to have a lower number of offspring or of neglecting the
offspring’s education. A system that imposes the obligation on children to make pension
payments to their own parents may reinstall the proper incentives for a human capital
investment. However, the existing pension systems do not impose such an obligation.
Instead they pool the children’s contributions and distribute them to their own parents and
other people’s parents independently of the individual amount of human capital invest-
ment. Whether such a collective enforcement system can nevertheless generate welfare
improvements will have to be discussed.
Section 2 of this paper will present a simple two-period model with a capital market,
human capital investment, and endogenously determined private pensions, that will serve
as a basis for studying the two effects. Section 3 will analyze the problem of fertility risk,
and Section 4 is devoted to the enforcement problem. The paper will end with a policy
conclusion which may be relevant to the current debate on PAYGO systems.2. A simple model of fertility choice and intergenerational transfers
Abstract for a moment from public pensions, fertility risk and enforcement problems
and consider a household that lives for two periods and can choose between two ways of
making an intertemporal resource transfer from the first to the second period. The first is
saving in the form of real (or financial) capital, SK ; the other is saving in the form of human
capital, SH, i.e., by raising children. Children are raised in the first period and work in the
second. Parents work in the first period and are retirees in the second. Taking second
period goods as numeraire, the price of first period goods is R, where R is one plus the rate
of interest on a capital market investment. R is fixed for technological reasons or since a
small open economy is assumed. For analytical convenience, SK and SH are defined in
terms of second period goods. While real capital thus defined generates a return SK which
is equal to the investment, human capital generates a return f ðSH Þ; f V> 0; f W< 0, in terms
of the labor income that children can earn in the second period. Let f VðSHÞ > 1 for some
range SH < SH*; SH* > 0 , to ensure that the inframarginal return on human capital
investment may exceed the return on investment in the capital market. It is assumed that
f ðSH Þ is the outcome of an optimal choice with regard to the decision about the quantity of
children and the quality of their education2. Parents are altruistic and care about aggregate
second-period consumption CC of their children whose number is determined through the2 Let n be the number of children and SH=n stand for the quality of education. The human capital production
function can then be defined such that f ðSH Þ ¼ maxnuðSH=n; nÞ. Under reasonable regularity assumptions, n will
be an increasing function of SH , and this is what is assumed.
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interpreted as an indicator of the infinite flow of consumption which the second and all
further generations’ optimal investment choices would generate out of the resources which
the parents transfer to their children. Let CP1 and CP2 be the parents’ first and second
period consumption and let T be a private pension transfer from children to their parents in
the second period. E is the family’s first period endowment, i.e., the sum of its material
wealth and labor income, net of potential transfers paid to the generation of grandparents,
again expressed in terms of second period goods.
The family’s intertemporal budget constraints are:
CP ¼ E  SH þ T ð1Þ
and
CC ¼ f ðSH Þ  T ð2Þ
where
CP ¼ RCP1 þ CP2 ð3Þ
is aggregate parent consumption in terms of second period goods. Eq. (1) says that
aggregate parent consumption equals the excess of parent endowment over human capital
investment plus pensions received from children, and Eq. (2) shows that (second period)
child consumption equals the difference between wage income and these pensions. Note
that saving in real capital (in terms of second period goods) is given by that part of the
endowment not used up for first period consumption and human capital investment,
SK ¼ E  RCP1  SH ; and that second period consumption by parents may result from
real and human capital investment, CP2 ¼ SK þ T :
Parents care for themselves and for their children. Parent utility is given by a strictly
concave nested function of the type U CC;V CP1;CP2ð Þ½  where V is an increasing, strictly
quasi concave sub-function reflecting the egoistic part of utility. Throughout, the paper bases
welfare judgments only on altruistic parent utility4. The rationale for not respecting
children’s preferences, other than through their own parents’ judgments, is that, in the
model, collective decisions in the form of introducing a PAYGO system are taken before the
children are born. Even if there were plausible welfare axioms that legitimate a double3 In general, the parents’ altruistic utility from child consumption can be taken to be a function of per capita
consumption and the number of children, W ðCC=n; nÞ . For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed here that
W ðCC=n; nÞ ¼ ðCC=nÞa  na ¼ CaC where a is a positive constant whose effect is amalgamated with the shape of
the overall utility function U. Admittedly, this is not a realistic assumption. However, it has the advantage of
delegating the implicit quantity–quality choice to the human capital investment decision (see footnote 2) and
separating it from the influence of intergenerational resource transfers. Alternatively, it could be assumed without
any change in the formal apparatus developed in this paper and no consequence for the formal propositions that
the number of children in the fertility case is fixed and that the human capital investment decision refers to
education only.
4 Thus the paper follows a basic assumption made in the seminal work of Razin and Ben-Zion (1975). See
Blackorby and Donaldson (1984), Nerlove et al. (1987) and Razin and Sadka (1995) for extensive discussions of
this issue.
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contribute to an understanding of the motives behind these collective decisions. For the time
being, the concentration on parent preferences will be complemented with the assumption
that parents and offspring share the same preferences or, alternatively, that parents can
enforce transfers from their children to themselves if they so wish. Section 4 will study the
implications of giving up this assumption.
Solving the problem:
max
ðCP1;CP2Þ
V ðCP1;CP2Þ s:t: ð3Þ ð4Þ
yields an indirect utility function V*ðCP;RÞ;where V* is strictly increasing in CP:Given R
and adjusting the shape of the overall utility function U, we may set CPuV*ðCP;RÞ
without any loss of generality. Thus the remaining optimization problem is:
max
ðCC ;CP;SH Þ
UðCC;CPÞ s:t: ð1Þ and ð2Þ: ð5Þ
Problem (4) yields the usual condition that the marginal rate of intertemporal
substitution be equal to the price of first period consumption:
V1
V2
¼ R;
and problem (5) yields:
f VðSH Þ ¼ U2
U1
¼ 1; ð6Þ
which says that the marginal product of a human capital investment and the marginal rate
of substitution of child for parent consumption be equal to one. As human capital
investment is defined in terms of second-period goods, this implies that, according to
the ordinary definition, the marginal rate of return on human capital, R  f VSHð Þ  1; equals
the marginal rate of return on real capital, R 1:
Fig. 1 illustrates the nature of the two-stage optimization problem solved by the
household, including the choice of an investment in the capital market, of an investment in
human capital, and of the private pensions paid by children to their parents. The upper part
of the diagram shows the household’s transformation curve between parent and child
resources and an indifference curve with regard to parent and child consumption, assuming
that parent consumption is optimally distributed between the first and second periods. The
optimal time structure of parent consumption is determined in the lower quadrant whose
axes measure the second period value of first period consumption, RCP1; and second
period consumption CP2: The budget lines with slope  1 indicate the transformation
possibilities given by the capital market and the indifference curves represent the parents’
egoistic sub-utility V CP1;CP2ð Þ: The optimal choice is represented by a pair of points in
the two parts of the diagram whose coordinates determine CC;CP;RCP1andCP2:
The parents could realize CP ¼ RCP1 ¼ E;CC ¼ CP2 ¼ 0; by not having children, by
not investing in the capital market, and by consuming all of their endowment E in the first
period, but there are significantly better strategies for them. One strategy would be giving
up some first-period consumption and save real capital in order to enjoy second period
Fig. 1. Optimal investment in human and real capital.
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lower quadrant and reach point X which indicates the optimal intertemporal distribution of
CP as given by RCP1 and CP2: An even better strategy is having children and investing in
human capital so as to produce a labor income f ðSHÞ earned by their children out of which
a private transfer, T ; can be paid. Call the locus of feasible combinations of child and
parent consumption attainable with alternative transfer levels the ‘redistribution line’.
There is one redistribution line for each point on the human capital production frontier, but
clearly the family will choose the most outward of these lines which is tangent to the
frontier at point 1, depicting marginal condition (6). The optimal combination of child and
parent consumption is given by point 2 where this redistribution line is tangent to a family
indifference curve. Accordingly, the intertemporal budget line for parent consumption will
shift outward so that it reaches the abscissa at the optimal level of overall parent
consumption. On this budget line, point Y indicates the new intertemporal distribution
of parent consumption. To summarize: points E and X characterize the household’s choice
when there are no children and when only real investment is feasible, and points 2 and Y
characterize the choice when an investment in human capital is also possible. As is
indicated in the figure with the two arrows along the abscissa, parents now simultaneously
invest the amount GL in real capital, SK ; and LE in human capital, SH : The possibility of
splitting savings between the two kinds of assets increases the utility UðCP;CCÞ of the
family and possibly even the egoistic part of parent utility, V ðCP1;CP2Þ:
It is sometimes argued that pensions cannot be a motive for having children when there
is a well functioning capital market because (real capital) savings are available as a means
H.-W. Sinn / Journal of Public Economics 88 (2004) 1335–1357 1341of receiving a resource transfer at retirement age. The model shows the limitations of this
argument. While the capital market offers a given rate of return R 1 on foregone first-
period consumption, a human capital investment offers an endogenous rate of return,
R  f V SHð Þ  1; which is generally higher and which will only equal it at the margin. The
existence of high inframarginal returns on a human capital investment makes children an
attractive investment for parents, and this would be so even if they did not have an
altruistic concern for their children.
Of course it may be doubted that the inframarginal return on human capital is really
higher than the rate of return on capital, in particular when the considerable fixed costs of
child raising is taken into account. Possibly, the human capital production curve in Fig. 1
does not start at E but further to the left such that high inframarginal returns do not
necessarily imply that the average rate of return on human capital investment will exceed
the market rate of interest. However, empirically the matter is very clear, and therefore the
fixed costs are neglected in the model. From 1961 to 1997, the average real rate of return
on US government bonds was about 2.7%. This was far less than the average real rate of
return on human capital investment, which various studies have placed in the range of 12–
26%5. Obviously the ability to invest in human capital has an enormous wealth effect on
the family’s intertemporal budget constraint which generates a private pension motive for
investing in human capital even if there is a well developed capital market. The following
proposition summarizes these findings.
Proposition 1. With enforceable transfers and in the absence of a public pension system,
marginal investment in human capital will be as productive as an investment in the capital
market. The existence of higher inframarginal returns on human capital implies that the
family gains utility from having children and investing in their human capital.
This result may seem puzzling when comparing it with the well known result of Aaron
(1966) according to which the rate of return of a PAYGO system, be it public or private,
equals the growth rate of the aggregate volume of intergenerational transfers which, in a
dynamically efficient economy, falls short of the rate of return on capital. Note, however,
that the Aaron return derives from comparing the payment flows from the working
generation to the old generation in two consecutive periods of time rather than from
comparing a person’s labor income with the cost of his education. To calculate Aaron’s
return in the present model, it would be necessary to compare the pensions that parents pay
to grandparents with the pensions parents themselves receive from their children. This
return would indeed be below the market rate of interest if the family’s income grows at
the average growth rate of the economy. As shown in Sinn (2000) the interest disadvantage
is not a sign of inefficiency but just an outcome of an intergenerational zero-sum game
with regard to the transfers from children to parents. All generations in an ongoing5 In a recent detailed study, the OECD (1998) estimates the returns on human capital to lie between 12.6%
for university education and 26.3% for upper secondary education in the US and finds similar values for all
OECD members. In a more conservative estimation, McMahon (1991) finds that, for males and females in the
US, the real rate of return to education ranges from 12% for high school education to 12–14% for college level
education.
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implicit pension debt inherited from earlier generations. The interest disadvantage that
results from this implicit tax is fully compatible with the interest advantage of human
capital investment. To say it pointedly: the Aaron return measures the award for being kind
to one’s predecessors, the return on a human capital investment the award for being kind to
one’s descendants.3. The pay-as-you-go system as fertility insurance
A household which is infertile, or for other reasons unable to raise children, will not be
able to realize the utility gain that results from child consumption and human capital
investment. Such a household would benefit from the introduction of a public PAYGO
system, because this systemwould make it possible to draw on the earnings capacity of other
people’s children. A PAYGO system pools some of the earnings capacity of children among
the old generation, and if the absence of such a capacity is bad luck rather than voluntary
choice, risk averse agents may perceive this system as a useful fertility insurance.
In many traditional societies where social insurance systems have not been established,
children are seen as an important safeguard against poverty in old age, and in the western
world things were not very different before the social security systems were developed6.
Without social security, biological infertility or a missed opportunity to find a partner with
whom it would be possible to have children is perceived as a major economic misfortune.
The public provision of the PAYGO pension system may be able to provide the desired
insurance against this misfortune.
Note that, under the constitutional laws of western societies, such insurance could not
be provided by private markets since this would imply that unmarried people can sign
contracts which force their subsequent children, when adult, to make payments to childless
members of the old generation. Contracts which imply such payments could only be made
by the children themselves, but when these children are old enough to do that, it is known
which families could not have children and therefore no voluntary payments will occur. A
mutually beneficial insurance contract is only conceivable before the children are born, but
then it is excluded by the constitution. Only a government imposed insurance is possible,
and the PAYGO system can be seen as such an insurance.
The PAYGO system may, however, not only have favorable implications. Most
insurance systems encounter moral hazard effects and the PAYGO system may not be
an exception. The particular moral hazard effect that can be analyzed by using the model
set up in the previous section is a reduction in human capital investment in the sense of
reducing the quantity of children and/or the quality of their education.
The PAYGO system changes the household’s budget constraints (1) and (2) to:
CP ¼ E  SH þ T þ B ð7Þ
and
CC ¼ f ðSH Þð1 sÞ  T ð8Þ6 See Neher (1971), Willis (1980) and Nugent (1985).
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the fertile and the infertile household. An infertile household faces the additional constraint
CC ¼ SH ¼ T ¼ 0 ðinfertile householdÞ:
Let p be the probability that the household is fertile and assume that fertility is a
stochastically independent event across all households7. Then the government budget
constraint is:
ps f ðSHÞ ¼ B: ð9Þ
The household decides about its human capital investment after it knows which type it
is. The infertile household takes E;B and hence, CP as given. It optimizes its intertemporal
consumption choice according to (4) and receives a utility
Uð0;CPÞ where CP ¼ E þ B:
The fertile household also takes E and B as given, but it can manipulate CP via its choice of
human capital investment. It maximizes UðCC;CPÞ s.t. (7) and (8), and it also optimizes its
intertemporal consumption choice according to (4). A necessary condition for the fertile
household’s optimum is:
f VðSH Þð1 sÞ ¼ U2
U1
¼ 1 ð10Þ
which implies that:
dSH
d
¼ 1
f WðSH Þ  ð1 Þ2
< 0: ð11Þ
Comparing Eqs. (10) and (6) shows that it will still be true that the household allocates
consumption between parents and children so as to equate the marginal rate of substitution
of child for parent consumption to one. However, the social security tax drives a wedge
between the marginal product of human capital and this marginal rate of substitution. As
Eq. (11) reveals, this wedge results in a decline in human capital investment. This is a
moral hazard effect of the PAYGO system which has been studied by various authors in
alternative frameworks8.
Proposition 2. While a PAYGO system may serve as fertility insurance, it brings with it a
moral hazard effect in terms of reducing the optimal investment in human capital.
To interpret this proposition properly note that the function f SHð Þ is meant to capture
such matters as the marriage decision, the decision to have children, and the decision to
invest in the education of a given number of children. The PAYGO system can be expected
to discourage each one of these decisions.7 The paper abstracts from any uncertainty in the income earned by a child, given that it was born. A useful
analysis of that type of uncertainty can be found in Rosati (1996).
8 See Nugent (1985), Cigno (1991, 1993), Felderer (1992), Cigno and Rosati (1996), Rosati (1996), Werding
(1997, 1998) or Becker and Barro (1988).
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the solution without the PAYGO system as known from Fig. 1. Taxing the return to human
capital shifts the net-of-tax production line down to the position f ðSHÞð1 sÞ; and the
optimal production point on this curve is 1j which corresponds to point 1Von the pre-tax
production line f ðSHÞ: Point 1Vis to the right of point 1 because, for any given SH ; the net-
of-tax production curve has a lower (absolute) slope than the pre-tax production curve and
because the slope of the former must be equal to one in the optimum. This demonstrates
the moral hazard effect in terms of underinvesting in human capital as given by (11).
The fertile household’s social security tax burden, sf SHð Þ; is given by the distance
1V1j, and its pension, B; equals the distance 1W1j. Because of (11) the ratio of the
distances 1W 1j and 1V1j is p , the probability of being fertile and the share of fertile
households in the population. Starting from point 1W the household can move to the south
east along a redistribution line by transferring resources between the generations. The
optimal consumption point is 2W where the slope of the indifference curve equals the slope
of the redistribution line.
Of course, the moral hazard effect occurs only with fertile people. Infertile people also
receive the pension, but they can only move from point 3 towards point 3W on the abscissa.
Note that the moral hazard effect does not depend on the assumption that the taxed
households do not get a full rebate in terms of pensions. Since the size of the pension a
household receives does not depend on the actions it chooses, the pension is a lump sum
rebate. The size of this rebate influences the optimal consumption pattern, but not the
optimal investment in human capital. Consider for a moment the extreme case where allFig. 2. The moral hazard effect of the PAYGO system.
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system. In this case the lump sum rebate B would equal the social security tax sf ðSH Þ and
thus the family can move along the redistribution line that leads through 1V. It will choose
point 2Vrather than 2W. However, in either case, 1Vgives the optimal pre-tax return on the
human capital investment in terms of the wage income earned by the children.
The case of a full lump sum rebate is useful because it indicates the excess burden of
the PAYGO system. Obviously the horizontal or vertical inward shift of the redistribution
line from position 2 to 2Vor 1 to 1Vmeasures the excess burden in terms of second period
consumption.
The reduction in marriage frequencies, birth rates and/or education efforts may be the
most important distortions the PAYGO system causes, and these distortions could be the
main explanation for the pension crises that western societies will face in the years to come.
Hard empirical evidence for this effect is difficult to find since the reproduction behavior of
people alters slowly. It may take generations for habits to change. Nevertheless, the literature
has produced a growing body of evidence that confirms the existence of such an effect9.
To assess the magnitude of the fiscal externality that results from charging descendants,
some thought must be given as to how the model contribution rate relates to the
contribution rate in existing PAYGO systems. This relationship is not trivial. Given the
contribution rate, there is a big fiscal externality in flat pension systems such as that of the
US and a smaller one in systems with individual accounts and a rough proportionality
between pensions and contributions like in Germany. Even in the German case, however,
the externality can be enormous. If a household decides to raise an additional child it will
establish a new dynasty of descendants. If all members of this dynasty will reproduce at
the average rate and earn an average income, 100% of the PAYGO contributions of this
child are a fiscal externality that benefits other dynasties, and under actual conditions
applying in Germany this is a sum of abouto90.000 in present value terms calculated for
the time from child birth10. Seen this way, the social security hypothesis means that paying
a mother o90.000 at the time of child birth, so as to compensate for the moral hazard
effect of the pension system, will increase the measured fertility rate. This does not seem
an implausible proposition.
The example of Germany is also interesting because it was in this country that
Bismarck introduced the first large-scale public pension system, and this system has
developed here further than in most other countries. In the nineteenth century, Germany’s
population growth was the third highest in Europe. Now this country has one of the
lowest birth rates of all OECD countries. Ten Germans have, on average, less than seven
children throughout their lives, and a fatal crisis in the public pension system is in sight.
In Germany, generations of households have learned that life in old age can be pleasant
and economically sound even without children. The idea of marrying and having children
in order to ensure satisfactory consumption in old age had been common before
Bismarck’s reforms. A century later, this idea has largely vanished, and a growing9 Cf. Caldwell (1982), Swindler (1986), Jensen (1990), and Cigno and Rosati (1996).
10 See Sinn (2001).
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income and no kids11.
The existence of an excess burden in terms of reduced human capital investment does
not necessarily imply that it is unwise to impose a PAYGO system. The redistribution
between fertile and infertile families which this system implies may still result in a net
increase of expected utility from an ex ante perspective, that is, before it is known whether
the household will be able to have children or not. In fact, it is possible to show that if
people are risk averse in the sense that they prefer the kind of redistribution provided by a
PAYGO system in the absence of moral hazard, they will like at least some of this
redistribution even if there is moral hazard.
Before a household knows whether or not it will be fertile, its expected utility is:
EUðCC;CPÞ ¼ p maxUðCC;CPÞ jð7Þ;ð8Þ þð1 pÞUð0;E þ BÞ
To see how expected utility is affected by a balanced budget increase in the pension level
differentiate this expression with respect to B:
dEU
dB
¼ p UC1
dCC
dB
þ UC2
dCP
dB
 
þ 1 pð ÞUNC2 : ð12Þ
Here the subscripts of the U terms indicate the derivatives with regard to the first and
second arguments, CC and CP; and the superscripts C and NC indicate whether these
derivatives are to be taken in the child or no-child situation. Using (10), Eq. (12) becomes:
dEU
dB
¼ pUC2 
dCC
dB
þ dCP
dB
 
þ 1 pð ÞUNC2 : ð13Þ
A balanced budget increase in B will necessarily increase the contribution rate s: This will
reduce the fertile family’s consumption possibilities and induce the moral hazard effect in
terms of reduced human capital investment. It follows from (7) and (8) that, for such a family,
dCC
dB
þ dCP
dB
¼ f VðSHÞð1 sÞ  1½  dSH
dB
þ 1 f ðSHÞ d
dB
: ð14Þ
Because of (10), the first term on the right hand side is zero, and Eq. (14) reduces to:
dCC
dB
þ dCP
dB
¼ 1 f ðSH Þ d
dB
; ð15Þ
where ds=dB follows from (9) and (10). Calculating ds=dB at s ¼ 0 gives:
ds
dB js¼0 ¼ 1p f ðSH Þ : ð16Þ
Inserting (16) into (15), and (15) into (13), yields, after a few arrangements,
dEU
dB
¼ ð1 pÞ UNC2  UC2
 
:11 Hard empirical evidence of the negative implication of the German pension system on fertility can be
found in Cigno et al. (2000).
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increase expected utility if, and only if, UNC2 > U
C
2 ; i.e., if the marginal utility of
consumption is higher for dynasties with bad luck than for those with good luck. Since U
was assumed to be strictly concave, and since fertility increases utility (cf. Fig. 2), this is a
plausible though not necessary case.
Note, however, that UNC2 > U
C
2 is a necessary condition for an increase of expected
utility in the absence of a moral hazard effect. Suppose we transfer the aggregate lump sum
amount dQ from families with children to those without children, keeping individual
behavior unchanged. Then the amount paid by a single household with children is
dQ= pNð Þ and the amount received by an unlucky household without children is
dQ= 1 pð ÞN½  where N is the size of the population. Expected utility changes by:
dQ
1 p ð1 pÞU
NC
2 
dQ
p
pUC2
 
1
N
;
an expression which obviously is greater than zero if, and only if, UNC2 > U
C
2 :
Proposition 3. If people are risk averse in the sense that a lump sum redistribution from
lucky (fertile) to unlucky (infertile) dynasties would increase expected utility, a moderate
PAYGO system will increase expected utility even though it generates a moral hazard
effect in terms of reducing investment in human capital.
The benefit from insurance is a first-order effect on expected utility, and the
disadvantage of moral hazard is a second-order effect. With small amounts of insurance
the first-order effect dominates the second-order effect. Thus a moderately designed
PAYGO system will be beneficial even though it discourages marriage, reduces the
number of children born in a family, and lowers the family’s investment in the education of
their children.4. The pay-as-you-go system as an enforcement device
The old age pension systems were introduced in order to improve the miserable
conditions of the old who did not receive enough transfers from the working generation.
One reason why an old person may not have received enough transfers was the lack of
children. Another reason was that the existing children may not have looked after their
parents. The assumption of ungrateful children seems to fit well into the evolutionary
explanation of human preferences and, as was explained in the introduction (cf. also
Footnote 1), it was the historical reason for the industrialized countries introducing the
pension system in the nineteenth century. Genetic evolution has been able to bring about
forward looking altruism from parents to children, but not the other way round. The old
saying that ‘‘a father can provide for seven children but that seven children cannot provide
for a father’’ reflects this trait of human preferences. The PAYGO system can be seen as a
compensating enforcement device that makes it impossible for children to free ride and
negate the intergenerational contract which was obeyed by the traditional family but lost
its force when industrialization loosened the family ties.
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without a PAYGO system. In the presence of one-sided altruism and loose family ties,
the allocation described in Section 2 and Fig. 1 with points 2 and Y will not be
available. Children will not make the transfer T to their parents, and parents who know
this will not be willing to make a human capital investment SH large enough to reach the
production point 1. Although parents have a concern for the consumption of their
children, they will not neglect their own consumption. Knowing that their children will
not let them share in the return on their human capital investment, parents will have to
respect the fact that they cannot, in general, separate the decision about how much to
invest in human capital from the intergenerational consumption decision. In Fig. 3a
parents would choose the production point characterized by Z rather than the one
characterized by 1. At Z, the production curve is steeper than at 1, indicating that the
rate of return to human capital investment is above the market rate of interest, Rf ðSH Þ
1 > R 1; and that investment in human capital is lower than in the case where the
family contract can be enforced.
The separation between consumption and investment would only be possible if
parents wished to give or bequeath real, as well as human, capital to their children. This
case is illustrated in Fig. 3b at point 2. Obviously, with an operative bequest motive the
optimal investment in human capital remains to be characterized by the condition that
f VðSH Þ ¼ 1:
Proposition 4. Suppose parents exhibit one-sided altruism for their children and cannot
force children to pay their pensions. Then those parents who wish to bequeath real capital
to their children will invest more in human capital than those who would have preferred
their children to pay them a pension. With the latter type, the rate of return to human
capital investment exceeds the rate of return to real investment, and this indicates
underinvestment in human capital.
To overcome the underinvestment in human capital it would be necessary to settle a
binding contract between parents and children before birth and education, which is notFig. 3. One sided altruism, bequests and the investment in human capital.
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most societies have customs and laws that imply such an obligation. Obviously, with an
extensive obligation which gives the parents at least the resources necessary to reach point
2 in Fig. 1, a first best solution is attainable. If children have to pay their parents more than
the parents want, a voluntary bequest would allow the fine tuning which is necessary to
reach an optimal allocation of consumption as seen from the parents’ perspectives.
However, the necessary implementation of such customs and laws may be difficult.
Parents will hardly sue their children if they do not pay enough. The legal system is well
suited to interfamily disputes but not so much to intrafamily disputes.
A PAYGO system that requires people to pay pensions to their parents via the
government budget is the alternative since the state can easily monitor and enforce the
contributions. The problem is, however, the moral hazard effect with regard to human
capital investment which was discussed above. Will a commitment via a PAYGO system
be able to reinstall the proper incentives for human capital investment and to increase
welfare even though the contributions are pooled and distributed among the parents
irrespective of their own investment in human capital?
To analyze this problem let us abstract from the risk of being infertile and assume that
parents would like to receive transfers from their children such that f VðSH Þ > 1 in the
absence of a commitment device, as illustrated in Fig. 3a. The family’s budget constraints
are, like (7) and (8),
CP ¼ E  SH þ T þ B ð17Þ
and
CC ¼ f ðSH Þð1 sÞ  T ð18Þ
where, however, one-sided altruism and the lack of a private enforcement mechanism
implies that:
TV0: ð19Þ
The government budget constraint is:
sf ðSH Þ ¼ B: ð20Þ
The Lagrangean for parents who want to maximize UðCC;CPÞ s.t. (17)–(19) is:
L ¼ UðCC;CPÞ þ k1  f ðSH Þð1 sÞ  T  CC½ 
þk2  ðE þ T þ B SH  CPÞ þ l  ðTÞ
where the k’s are Lagrangean multipliers and l is a Kuhn–Tucker multiplier. As before, the
parents optimize their intertemporal consumption pattern according to (4), using the capital
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an optimum include:
U1 ¼ k1;
U2 ¼ k2;
A ¼ k2  k1;
k2 ¼ k1f VðSH Þð1 sÞ;
l  ðTÞ ¼ 0:
They obviously imply that:
U2
U1
¼ f VðSHÞð1 sÞ >¼
 
1 if TV0 is a
strictly binding
non binding
 
constraint: ð21Þ
Expression (21) shows that, as in the previous section, the marginal rate of substitution of
child for parent consumption equals the net-of-tax marginal product of human capital.
However, both of these values equal one if, and only if, the pension is so generous that
parents wish to return some of it to their children ðT < 0Þ: If the pension is so low that
parents would like to receive additional transfers from their own children, the marginal rate
of substitution and the net-of-tax marginal product exceed unity. If the net-of-tax marginal
product equals one and the contribution rate is positive, there is the moral hazard effect
analyzed in the last section. If the net-of-tax marginal product exceeds one there is, in
addition, the underinvestment motive resulting from the lack of enforcement. Thus,
whatever regime applies, there is an underinvestment in human capital.
Proposition 5. The PAYGO system is unable to mimic the private enforcement rules of the
traditional family with regard to the incentives for an investment in human capital that
these rules imply. The pooling of the contributions will result in an underinvestment in
human capital, regardless of whether the contributions are large enough to allow for an
operative bequest motive or not.
As is well known, there are many similarities between a PAYGO system and public
debt. In fact, the creation and redemption of a public debt can be seen as a transfer
payment from the young to the old just like the one brought about by the PAYGO system.
Thus Proposition 5 also dims the hope once expressed by Drazen (1978, p. 514) that
government debt might help people specialize in the investment of human capital and
reinstall the first best efficiency condition for such an investment. For such a result to
occur it would have been necessary to assume either that people coordinate their individual
fertility decisions or that the taxes could be tailored to each individual family so that a
redistribution between child-rich and child-poor families can be avoided. When the
individual pays a labor income tax of the normal kind, a distortion in the human capital
formation is bound to result.
Despite this outcome, it may still be true that a PAYGO system, or public debt for that
matter, brings about a welfare increase. After all, this system is an enforcement device that
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of the positive and negative welfare effects resulting from the resource transfer and the
moral hazard effect, suppose that the government tries to increase utility by designing a
reform of the PAYGO system subject to (17)–(19), (21) and its budget constraint (20). The
government will have to calculate the marginal utility increase from a balanced budget
increase of the tax rate,
dUðCC;CPÞ
ds
¼ U1 dCC
ds
þ U2 dCP
ds
;
which, because of (21), can also be written in the form:
dUðCC;CPÞ
dH
¼ dCC
ds
þ f VðSH Þð1 sÞ dCP
ds
 
U1 ð22Þ
Differentiating (17) and (18) with respect to s;where the moral hazard effect on SH is taken
into account, gives12
dCP
ds
¼  dSH
ds
þ dT
ds
þ dB
ds
and
dCC
ds
¼ f VðSHÞ 1 sð Þ dSH
ds
 f ðSH Þ  dT
ds
:
Inserting these equations into (22), rearranging terms and abbreviating the notation one
gets:
dU
ds
¼
(
½ f V ð1 sÞ  1dT
dH
þ f V ð1 sÞdB
ds
 f
)
U1: ð23Þ
The first term in the curved bracket is zero since (21) reveals that either f V ð1 sÞ  1 ¼ 0
or T¼ dT=ds ¼ 0: A differentiation of the government budget constraint (20) gives:
dB
ds
¼ f þ sf V dSH
ds
:
Hence Eq. (23) becomes:
dU
ds
¼ f V ð1 sÞ f þ sf V dSH
ds
 
 f
 
U1: ð24Þ
There are a few observations about this equation which are worth noting.12 As CP indicates both aggregate parent consumption in in the two periods as well as the egoistic part of
utility, the current analysis incorporates an endogenous reaction of the parents’ savings decision to a change in the
PAYGO contribution rate s.
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tax rates f V ð1 sÞ approximates the marginal productivity of human capital at point Z in
Fig. 3 which was assumed to be strictly greater than one since parents prefer to receive
transfers from their children. This implies that (24) becomes:
dU
ds js¼0 ¼ ðf V 1Þf  U1 > 0:
Thus, a moderately sized PAYGO system will always increase welfare even though it
generates a moral hazard effect in terms of reducing the investment in human capital. As in
the previous section, the utility loss from moral hazard is a second-order effect that is
unable to counteract the direct utility gain from the installment of a pension system as
such. The difference is only that there the direct utility gain resulted from insurance against
infertility while here it results from a resource transfer towards the old that the ungrateful
children would not have voluntarily carried out.
Fig. 4 illustrates this result. Taxation shifts the net-of-tax production curve downward and
results in a tax and pension level equal to B. If the investment decision does not change,
parents can now realize point Z W rather than Z, and obviously a higher indifference curve isFig. 4. Welfare gains from a moderate PAYGO system.
H.-W. Sinn / Journal of Public Economics 88 (2004) 1335–1357 1353attainable. Note that the line ZZ W has a slope of  1 while the slope of the indifference curve
at Z is smaller than  1. This ensures that Z W lies outside the production possibility set.
Without the enforcement of transfers, parents would also have been able to increase
their own consumption by simply choosing a lower human capital investment, but, given
the high marginal product of human capital investment, this would have been much more
costly in terms of their descendants’ consumption and would therefore not have been done.
Thus, a deeper reason for the welfare gain resulting from the redistribution enforced by the
PAYGO system can be seen in the fact that this system offers parents a cheaper way to
ensure a sufficient old age consumption than a decision to have fewer children and to give
them an inferior education.
In Fig. 4 it has been assumed that the slope of the indifference curve at Z W is the same
as that of the net-of-tax production curve at point Z V. It is known from (21) that, under
these circumstances, parents’ optimal investment does not change, but of course this is
only a special case of the model set up above. In general, the two slopes will not be equal,
and the optimal amount of human capital investment will therefore change. The welfare
effect resulting from this change is the second-order effect which was shown to be too
small to dominate the first-order effect illustrated in the figure.
Whether SH will rise or fall after the introduction of a PAYGO system depends on the
relative strength of two countervailing effects. One is the decline of the net-of-tax marginal
product of human capital with any given level of SH : This in itself generates the moral
hazard effect discussed in the previous section; i.e., a decline in SH :The other effect results
from the forced redistribution in favor of the parents which is likely to make parents more
willing to invest in human capital in the sense of reducing the marginal rate of substitution
of child for parent consumption. Unless more constraints are imposed on the possible
technologies and preferences it is impossible to say which of these effects will dominate.
Another observation, which is readily available from Eq. (24), refers to the case of an
interior solution to the intergenerational transfer problem where parents bequeath resour-
ces to their children in addition to paying for their education. From (21) it is known that, in
the case of an interior solution, f VðSH Þ  ð1 sÞ ¼ 1which implies that, as already stated in
(11),
dSH
ds jT<0 ¼ 1f W ð1 sÞ2 < 0:
Obviously it then follows from (24) that:
dU
ds jT<0 ¼ sf Vf W ð1 sÞ2  U1 < 0;
i.e., that a marginal increase in the contribution rate lowers welfare. This implies that it can
never be optimal to choose a contribution rate high enough to induce parents to return
some of their pensions to their children. Bequests are a clear sign that the PAYGO system
is overdrawn and creates an unnecessarily large moral hazard effect.
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for parents to reach point D which yields more pensions, B, than they would like to have.
The parents return some of the pensions to their children ðT < 0Þ thus moving to the point
of tangency 2V. Given that there is an interior solution to the intergenerational transfer
problem, the investment decision is separated from the consumption decision and human
capital investment is determined such as to make the net-of-tax marginal product of human
capital equal to one.
Point 2Vcharacterizes an overshooting because a reduction of the contribution rate
would shift point 1V to the north west along the production curve. The budget line cutting
through this point would shift outward towards the dotted line through points 1 and 2,
making it possible to reach a higher utility level as long as the point of tangency 2Vremains
to the left of point D. Clearly, therefore, in a second-best optimum points 2Vand D have to
coincide so as to make it unnecessary for the parents to return some of their pension to
their offspring.
In general, the set of allocations the government can attain through the choice of the
contribution rate is given by a curve like the white one connecting points Z, 2Vand the
origin of the production curve ðwhere CP ¼ EÞ: Point 2Vis just one of the feasible points
lying in the inefficient range, and point Z W from Fig. 4 would be another one, located on
the efficient downward sloping part of the white line. The next proposition summarizes the
information gathered on the optimal tax problem involved.Fig. 5. Overshooting the optimum.
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serve as an enforcement device that helps the economy overcome some of the
disadvantages resulting from the impossibility of making binding pension contracts
between parents and children. Despite a moral hazard effect with regard to human capital
investment, a moderately designed PAYGO system will increase social welfare. However, a
PAYGO system which is so generous that parents return some of their pensions to their
children cannot be optimal. Welfare would increase by cutting the social security tax and
the pension level.5. Concluding remarks
This paper has presented a basically favorable view of the allocation function of a
PAYGO pension system. Despite the fact that the PAYGO system induces a moral hazard
effect in terms of reducing the individual incentives for an investment in human capital, it
may bring about welfare improvements. A moderately sized PAYGO system may serve as
‘fertility insurance’, protecting risk averse households against the risk of being infertile or
not finding a partner for marriage and reproduction. A moderately sized PAYGO system
may also improve welfare because it enforces a resource transfer from ungrateful children
to parents which otherwise could only have been achieved in a much more costly way by
cutting the amount of human capital investment.
None of these effects requires the absence of a capital market as might be suspected. In
fact, the parent household always makes use of this market, optimizing the time path of its
own consumption by an appropriate financial investment strategy. The reason why the
household nevertheless prefers a substantial amount of human capital investment is the
high inframarginal return to such investment which exceeds the constant return the capital
market can offer.
The results should be a warning to those who find the theoretical case for the abolition
of the PAYGO system clear enough to make corresponding policy recommendations.
There are more problems than the labor/leisure distortion and the seemingly poor rate of
return offered by a PAYGO system, and even these problems may not provide valid
arguments in favor of a transition to a funded system if it is impossible to disregard
existing pension claims13.
On the other hand, the present paper also shows that only a moderate PAYGO system
can be defended, since the adverse effects on human capital investment decisions create
second-order welfare losses that counteract the first-order gains from the insurance and
enforcement effects. If there is one-sided altruism from parents to children and if parents
cannot force their children to pay them a pension, it is definitely wrong to implement a
scale of the PAYGO system generous enough to induce parents to bequeath resources to
their children. If bequests occur, the system is overdrawn and needs to be curtailed at least
to the point where the voluntary bequests vanish.13 See Fenge (1995) and Sinn (2000).
H.-W. Sinn / Journal of Public Economics 88 (2004) 1335–13571356Unfortunately, even in an optimally designed PAYGO system there will always be an
underinvestment in human capital. This remains a somewhat disturbing conclusion of the
analysis of this paper, emphasizing the need to discuss family and education policies
complementing the analysis in this paper.Acknowledgements
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